ALDI WINS A FIGHT AGAINST WINEMAKERS ALLOWING TO SELL BRANDED CHAMPAGNE SORBETS

09/01/2018

Aldi Süd, the giant discount supermarket chain from Germany, was allowed to carry on selling branded Champagne sorbets, notwithstanding EU protection of the name.

 

The Comité Inteprofessionnel du Vin de Champagne (“CIPV”), a French association of champagne producers, brought proceedings before the German courts against the German discount supermarket Aldi Süd to prohibit it from selling a sorbet under the name ‘Champagner Sorbet’. That sorbet, which Aldi Süd started selling at the end of 2012, contains 12% champagne. Taking the view that the distribution of that product under that name constituted an infringement of the PDO ‘Champagne’, the association of champagne producers, brought proceedings based on Article 118m of Regulation No 1234/2007 and Article 103 of Regulation No 1308/2013, prohibiting Aldi from using that name on the frozen goods market. According to the CIPV, the distribution of the sorbet under that name infringes the protected designation of origin (hereafter, PDO) ‘Champagne’. The German Federal Court of Justice has requested a preliminary ruling to the European Court of Justice for an interpretation of EU rules on the protection of PDOs.

Having analysed relevant provisions, the European Court of Justice upheld that Aldi could continue calling its product ‘Champagner Sorbet’ as it does not unfairly take advantage of the reputation that Champagne producers gain from using the iconic name. According to the Court, in the present case the use of the name ‘Champagner Sorbet’ to refer to a sorbet containing champagne is liable to extend to that product the reputation of the PDO ‘Champagne’, which conveys an image of quality and prestige, and therefore to take advantage of that reputation. However, such use of the name ‘Champagner Sorbet’ does not take undue advantage and, therefore, does not exploit the reputation of the PDO ‘Champagne’ if the product concerned has, as one of its essential characteristics, a taste that is primarily attributable to champagne.

It follows that the use of a PDO as part of the name under which is sold a foodstuff that does not correspond to the product specifications for that PDO but contains an ingredient which does correspond to those specifications cannot be regarded as an unfair use and, therefore, as a use against which PDOs are protected under Article 118m(2)(a)(ii) of Regulation No 1234/2007 and Article 103(2)(a)(ii) of Regulation No 1308/2013. As a consequence, it is for the national courts to determine, on the case to case basis, whether such use is intended to take unfair advantage of the reputation of a PDO.

Further, the European Court noted that if the sorbet in question did not have, as an essential characteristic, a taste which is primarily attributable to champagne, it would equally be possible to conclude that the name ‘Champagner Sorbet’ on the inner or outer packaging of the product constituted a false or misleading indication and was therefore unlawful. A PDO is protected not only against false or misleading indications which are liable to create a false impression as to the origin of the product concerned, but also against false or misleading indications relating to the nature or essential qualities of the product. Where the PDO ‘Champagne’ is used directly, by being incorporated in the name of the product in question, to openly claim a gustatory quality connected with it, that does not amount to misuse, imitation or evocation within the meaning of EU rules on the protection of PDOs.


ALDI WINS A FIGHT AGAINST WINEMAKERS ALLOWING TO SELL BRANDED CHAMPAGNE SORBETS

09/01/2018

Aldi Süd, the giant discount supermarket chain from Germany, was allowed to carry on selling branded Champagne sorbets, notwithstanding EU protection of the name.

 

The Comité Inteprofessionnel du Vin de Champagne (“CIPV”), a French association of champagne producers, brought proceedings before the German courts against the German discount supermarket Aldi Süd to prohibit it from selling a sorbet under the name ‘Champagner Sorbet’. That sorbet, which Aldi Süd started selling at the end of 2012, contains 12% champagne. Taking the view that the distribution of that product under that name constituted an infringement of the PDO ‘Champagne’, the association of champagne producers, brought proceedings based on Article 118m of Regulation No 1234/2007 and Article 103 of Regulation No 1308/2013, prohibiting Aldi from using that name on the frozen goods market. According to the CIPV, the distribution of the sorbet under that name infringes the protected designation of origin (hereafter, PDO) ‘Champagne’. The German Federal Court of Justice has requested a preliminary ruling to the European Court of Justice for an interpretation of EU rules on the protection of PDOs.

Having analysed relevant provisions, the European Court of Justice upheld that Aldi could continue calling its product ‘Champagner Sorbet’ as it does not unfairly take advantage of the reputation that Champagne producers gain from using the iconic name. According to the Court, in the present case the use of the name ‘Champagner Sorbet’ to refer to a sorbet containing champagne is liable to extend to that product the reputation of the PDO ‘Champagne’, which conveys an image of quality and prestige, and therefore to take advantage of that reputation. However, such use of the name ‘Champagner Sorbet’ does not take undue advantage and, therefore, does not exploit the reputation of the PDO ‘Champagne’ if the product concerned has, as one of its essential characteristics, a taste that is primarily attributable to champagne.

It follows that the use of a PDO as part of the name under which is sold a foodstuff that does not correspond to the product specifications for that PDO but contains an ingredient which does correspond to those specifications cannot be regarded as an unfair use and, therefore, as a use against which PDOs are protected under Article 118m(2)(a)(ii) of Regulation No 1234/2007 and Article 103(2)(a)(ii) of Regulation No 1308/2013. As a consequence, it is for the national courts to determine, on the case to case basis, whether such use is intended to take unfair advantage of the reputation of a PDO.

Further, the European Court noted that if the sorbet in question did not have, as an essential characteristic, a taste which is primarily attributable to champagne, it would equally be possible to conclude that the name ‘Champagner Sorbet’ on the inner or outer packaging of the product constituted a false or misleading indication and was therefore unlawful. A PDO is protected not only against false or misleading indications which are liable to create a false impression as to the origin of the product concerned, but also against false or misleading indications relating to the nature or essential qualities of the product. Where the PDO ‘Champagne’ is used directly, by being incorporated in the name of the product in question, to openly claim a gustatory quality connected with it, that does not amount to misuse, imitation or evocation within the meaning of EU rules on the protection of PDOs.


L’AUTORITÀ ANTITRUST PRENDE POSIZIONE SULL’INFLUENCER MARKETING

26/07/2017

Con un comunicato stampa rilasciato lo scorso 24 luglio il Garante Antitrust ha informato di aver inviato alcune lettere di moral suasion ad alcuni operatori attivi nella sponsorizzazione di brand on line mediante la tecnica dell’influencer marketing, invitandoli a conformarsi alle prescrizioni del Codice del Consumo.

 

L’Autorità Antitrust dichiara di aver svolto alcune indagini in merito all’attività di sponsorizzazione di prodotti definita influencer marketing.

La pratica commerciale richiamata consiste nella pubblicazione da parte di personaggi di riferimento del mondo on line seguiti da numerosi follower (detti blogger o influencer) di immagini relative a prodotti riconducibili ad un determinato brand sui propri blog, vlog e social media (come Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, Youtube, Snapchat, MySpace, ecc…) senza che però venga manifestata la natura pubblicitaria della comunicazione, così che i follower vengono indotti a recepire quella che di fatto è una vera e propria forma di sponsorizzazione di un prodotto come un consiglio derivante dall’esperienza privata e personale dell’influencer.

Il primo passo svolto dall’Autorità Antitrust sembra essere quello di indurre spontaneamente sia gli influencer che le società titolari dei marchi sponsorizzati a fornire adeguate informazioni al momento della pubblicazione dei contenuti sui social media, idonei a rivelare la natura commerciale della comunicazione (sussistente sia nel caso in cui il product placement sia eseguito dietro compenso che a fronte della fornitura gratuita di prodotti).

La richiesta svolta con le lettere di moral suasion è quella di adeguarsi alle disposizioni generali previste dal Codice del Consumo, secondo cui la pubblicità deve essere riconoscibile come tale affinché l’intento commerciale della comunicazione sia chiaramente percepibile dal consumatore. Il Garante ha dichiarato che nel caso dell’influencer marketing l’evidente finalità promozionale dovrà essere manifestata attraverso l’inserimento di specifiche avvertenze che, in linea con le modalità di comunicazione proprie dei social network, possono per esempio consistere nell’utilizzo di appositi hashtag quali #pubblicità, #sponsorizzato, #advertising, #inserzioneapagamento e #fornitoda seguito dal nome del relativo brand sponsorizzato.


APPEAL IS INADMISSIBLE IF THE ORIGINAL DEED IS NOT DIGITALLY UNDERSIGNED

04/07/2017

The Italian Supreme Court recently held that the lack of a digital signature on the original of the appeal deed determines the inadmissibility of the appeal itself on grounds that the legal challenge is non-existent and cannot be remedied even if the defendant joins the proceedings.

 

With judgment no. 14338 of 8 June 2017, the Italian Supreme Court once again considered one of the matters that has been most disputed in recent years, namely the consequences of the failure to comply with the regulations governing serving by lawyers via certified electronic mail. Such regulations, starting with Law no. 53/1994, have been subject to significant changes mostly brought about by the need to remain in line with the technological evolution of the IT instruments being used.

In this case, the Court of Appeal of Salerno held that the appeal commenced with the serving of a deed of appeal bereft of digital signature was inadmissible in so far as such a defect of the deed could not be remedied even if the defendant joined the proceedings and raised the relevant exception. The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeal of Salerno on the point of inadmissibility but partly changed the decision of the lower court. The Supreme Court stated that the digital signature on the electronic deed is fully identical to the hand signature on a paper version of the deed and such a requirement must be understood to be a condition for the validity of the deed pursuant to art. 125 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in so far as it aides to trace the deed to a specific individual.

However, the Supreme Court held that what is relevant is not only the lack of digital signature of the served copy of the deed (a matter which the petitioner focused on), but also its omission from the original deed, a circumstance which unto itself is sufficient for determining the inadmissibility of the appeal.

The decision of the Italian Supreme Court for the first time abandons the previous “anti-formalistic” approaches that supported the attainment of the objective of a legal deed even if regulations on electronic serving were not fully complied with. This new approach, which initially helped avoid burdening judges with minor exceptions, has evidently led to the opposite result, that is to a total lack of compliance with procedure, which the Court decided to remedy.


APPEAL IS INADMISSIBLE IF THE ORIGINAL DEED IS NOT DIGITALLY UNDERSIGNED

04/07/2017

The Italian Supreme Court recently held that the lack of a digital signature on the original of the appeal deed determines the inadmissibility of the appeal itself on grounds that the legal challenge is non-existent and cannot be remedied even if the defendant joins the proceedings.

 

With judgment no. 14338 of 8 June 2017, the Italian Supreme Court once again considered one of the matters that has been most disputed in recent years, namely the consequences of the failure to comply with the regulations governing serving by lawyers via certified electronic mail. Such regulations, starting with Law no. 53/1994, have been subject to significant changes mostly brought about by the need to remain in line with the technological evolution of the IT instruments being used.

In this case, the Court of Appeal of Salerno held that the appeal commenced with the serving of a deed of appeal bereft of digital signature was inadmissible in so far as such a defect of the deed could not be remedied even if the defendant joined the proceedings and raised the relevant exception. The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeal of Salerno on the point of inadmissibility but partly changed the decision of the lower court. The Supreme Court stated that the digital signature on the electronic deed is fully identical to the hand signature on a paper version of the deed and such a requirement must be understood to be a condition for the validity of the deed pursuant to art. 125 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in so far as it aides to trace the deed to a specific individual.

However, the Supreme Court held that what is relevant is not only the lack of digital signature of the served copy of the deed (a matter which the petitioner focused on), but also its omission from the original deed, a circumstance which unto itself is sufficient for determining the inadmissibility of the appeal.

The decision of the Italian Supreme Court for the first time abandons the previous “anti-formalistic” approaches that supported the attainment of the objective of a legal deed even if regulations on electronic serving were not fully complied with. This new approach, which initially helped avoid burdening judges with minor exceptions, has evidently led to the opposite result, that is to a total lack of compliance with procedure, which the Court decided to remedy.